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Effects of Assets on Attitudes and Behaviors: Advance Test of A Social Policy Proposal Rationale
In his 1994 welfare reform proposal, President Clinton included a number of measures to increase asset limits and create special savings accounts called individual development accounts (IDAs) . These proposals, presented as legislation, were sponsored by Senators Daniel Moynihan, Edward Kennedy and others; and by Representatives Sam Gibbons, Dick Gephardt and others.
Other proposals for IDA demonstrations had already been introduced by Representatives Tony Hall, Bill Emerson and Cardiss Collins, and by Senator Bill Bradley. Almost every welfare reform proposal, Republican and Democrat, would raise asset limits to encourage saving. This bipartisan emphasis on asset building is a new, and untested, approach to anti-poverty policy.
Assets are typically viewed as a storehouse for future consumption, but they may have important psychological and social effects as well. A fundamental theme in American culture suggests that wealth and property holding may have positive impacts on personal well-being, social status, and citizen participation. This theme has deep historical roots and a long-lasting influence in public policy. It is an idea that was expounded by Thomas Jefferson, recorded in the observations of Alexis de Tocqueville, and later invoked as a rationale for such policies as the Homestead Act, government-backed home mortgage lending programs, employee stock ownership plans, and proposals for ownership of public housing. i However, specification of psychological and social effects of asset holding is not well developed. Typically, effects of asset holding have been presented as broad normative statements (e.g., Thomas Jefferson) or as sweeping narrative observations (e.g., Alexis de Tocqueville). To be sure, a number of eminent scholars, including Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Thorstein Veblen, William James, and others, have commented in various ways on effects of property holding, but clear propositions have seldom been formulated. The discussion has been more in the realm of social philosophy than social science. The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical test of the effects of assets on attitudes and behaviors.
Studies of Attitudes, Behavior, and Economic Status
In related research, several studies have been undertaken to assess relationships among attitudes, behaviors, and subsequent changes in labor force participation and income. Duncan and Hill (1975) examine the extent to which attitudes such as efficacy, trust, aspiration and ambition, risk avoidance, connectedness, time horizon, and economizing behavior affect economic status. Their study examines the effect of attitudes, behaviors, and economic status over a five year period between 1968 and 1972. These researchers conclude that the effects of attitudes and behaviors on economic status are negligible, and "despite the fact that some attitudes and behavior patterns had statistically significant effects on income change, they did not have powerful effects" (Duncan and Hill, 1975, p.99) . Andrisani (1977) studies the relationship between internal-external attitudes and labor market experience. Based on modest effects he concludes that internal-external attitudes are systematically related to labor market experiences such as growth in average hourly earnings and occupational attainment. Duncan and Morgan (1981) , on the other hand, conclude that attitudes are not important in explaining economic success.
In looking at this research overall, two features are evident. First, most of the studies focus on effects of attitudes and behavior on subsequent economic status, rather than vice versa (although occasionally researchers have examined effects of income on social and psychological factors; see Duncan and Hill, 1975) . Second, most of the measures of economic status are based on some measure of income or an income-needs ratio. There is little systematic research on assets and their possible relationships with attitudinal and behavioral variables.
Studies Relating Assets with Social and Psychological Variables
There is a long history of cross-national research on correlates of property holding in anthropology and sociology (Rudman, 1992 , provides an excellent review). Most of the work is ethnographic, although limited systematic studies have appeared in the last half-century. The unit of analysis in these studies is not at the individual or household level, and the work generally does not speak to attitudinal and behavioral variables. Much of this body of work has a marked ideological bias either categorizing the harmful results or extolling the virtues of private property.
In modern sociology we find a large literature associating assets with social power (Mills, 1956; Kolko, 1962; Domhoff, 1971) , but the focus is typically on the social power of the upper class, where assets are concentrated. There is little attempt to examine effects of asset holding among other population groups, or to specify propositions that might be tested in heterogeneous populations.
Some noteworthy exceptions, stating clear hypotheses and using empirical data, are by Kohn et al. (1990) , who systematically test psychological effects of asset holding, including selfdirectedness and intellectual flexibility, in Japan, Poland, and the United States; and Vosler and Page-Adams (1993) , who test the relationship between property holding and depression among auto workers in the United States. In both of these studies, significant effects of asset holding are found after controlling for income and education.
As an additional step toward formulating this idea in terms accessible to systematic analysis, Sherraden (1990 Sherraden ( , 1991 has developed propositions regarding attitudinal and behavioral effects of asset holding. The suggested effects include greater household stability, increased long-term thinking and planning, increased effort in maintaining and enhancing assets, increased human capital development, increased risk taking, greater personal efficacy and self esteem, increased social status, increased community involvement, and increased political participation.
These propositions are stated at a general level, but they invite systematic tests. Haveman (1992) suggests that Sherraden may have "the signs on the relevant coefficients correct," but that confirmatory evidence is lacking.
For obvious reasons, it is very desirable to test asset-based policy proposals in advance, using any available empirical data. However, because assets and their effects have not been a focus of previous theory and research, most data sets do not offer opportunities for such tests. Fortunately, between 1968 and 1972 , and only in these years, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) included a wide range of attitudes and behaviors. When combined with PSID asset measures of savings and house value, we have an opportunity --as far as we know the only existing opportunity --for a longitudinal test. In addition, we can simultaneously test for two major alternative explanations. The first alternative explanation is that attitudes and behaviors cause assets rather than vice versa. The second alternative explanation is that income, not assets, affects attitudes and behaviors. These different explanations are not mutually exclusive. It is likely that both income and assets affect attitudes and behaviors in similar directions, but to some extent independently; and the relationship between assets and attitudes and behaviors probably works both ways (Sherraden, 1991) .
In this paper, we take a step toward testing the general theoretical statement that assets have effects on certain attitudes and behaviors (usually thought of as positive). Taking into account the theoretical statement and the two alternative explanations, we test for the following: a) the effect of assets on attitudes and behaviors; b) the effect of attitudes and behaviors on assets; c) the effect of income on attitudes and behaviors; and d) the effect of attitudes and behaviors on income.
Data and Procedures
A large proportion of the research on attitudes, behavior, and economic status is based on the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is an on-going longitudinal survey of 5000 families, begun in 1968, conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan (Hill, 1992) . The study began with 4,802 households --1,872 low-income households were drawn from the Survey of Economic Opportunity and another 2,930 households were drawn from the national sampling frame of the Survey Research Center (Hill, 1992) . Heads of household from PSID were selected to study the relationship between assets and attitudes and behaviors. Our final sample has 2,871 cases after filtering the data for accuracy and for those who were heads of household in both 1968 and 1972. The mean age is 43 years. Overall, 75 percent of the household heads are male and 25 percent are female. Regarding race, 66 percent are white, 32 percent are black, and the remaining 2 percent are Puerto-Rican, Mexican, or other.
Fortunately, it is possible to use the PSID to explore effects of assets on attitudes and behaviors and vice versa. Specifically, we can examine the effects of assets on prudence, efficacy, horizons, connectedness, and effort (variables explained below). However, the analysis is constrained by certain limitations in the data set. As with Duncan and Hill (1975) , we restrict our analysis to a five year period from 1968 to 1972 because data on attitudes and behaviors have not been collected after 1972.
ii The PSID data set also enables us to examine simultaneously the two major alternative explanations. Accordingly, we examine the effect of income while testing for the effect of assets on attitudes and behaviors; and we also test for the second alternative explanation, that attitudes and behaviors affect assets rather than vice versa. All the effects were simultaneously estimated as a path model of directly observed variables using LISREL 8. A causal model with directly observed variables, such as the one tested here, is also classified as Submodel 2 in LISREL (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1989, chap. 4) . This is a class of models where the dependent and explanatory variables are directly observed.
Variables such as house value and income are directly observed and are used as such in the path model. All of the attitude and behavior variables and the savings variable are indices derived from other observed variables. Every index used in this analysis was derived, by the PSID staff, from a combination of weighting and aggregation of responses to specific sets of observed variables. The primary reason for using the PSID indices is that they have been used in previous analyses (Duncan and Hill, 1975; Andrisani, 1977; Duncan and Morgan, 1981) , and we can thus compare our results with the relevant related research. Each index in the present study is used as an observed variable. Computation of a measurement model is not relevant since we used each of the indices as an observed variable; therefore we use a path model instead of a structural equation model with latent variables. Variables associated with each of the summated indices are specified in the footnotes.
Unlike traditional path models, it is possible to simultaneously estimate all effects in a path analysis model for directly observed variables using LISREL. In the traditional path analytic model, one obtains reduced form equations first, and then solves for the structural parameters (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1989) . Whereas in LISREL, a path model is considered as a system of equations and all structural coefficients are estimated directly and the reduced form is obtained as a by-product (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993) . In causal models of directly observed variables there are no latent variables, only directly measured variables: y's and x's. Since there are no latent constructs, a measurement model and the associated factor loadings (represented in LAMBDA-x, and LAMBDA-y matrices), and correlations of measurement error (represented in THETA-DELTA, and THETA-EPSILON matrices) are not relevant and therefore not estimated.
Matrices representing factor loadings are fixed to identity, and matrices of measurement error are fixed to zero (Bollen, 1989, p. 147) . Moreover, in this submodel, the covariance matrix of independent constructs is assumed to be an unconstrained free covariance matrix of x variables (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1989, p. 146) .
We estimated the effect of assets in 1968 on all the attitudes and behaviors in 1972, while controlling for effects of the respective attitudes and behaviors in 1968. Similarly, we estimated the effects of attitudes and behaviors in 1968 on assets in 1972 while controlling for time one effects of assets and income. Both sets of effects were tested simultaneously in the same model.
In addition, we simultaneously estimated the effects of income in 1968 on attitudes and behaviors in 1972, and vice versa, in the same model.
Control Variables
Age, race, gender, education of the head of household, and a variable indicating the presence of young children in the family are used as control variables. Age is the reported age of the head of household and education is the number of years of school completed by the head of household. Race (1 = white, 0 = non-white) and gender (1 = male, 0 = female) are ordinal variables that have been dummy coded. The question --how old is the youngest child under 18 in family unit? --is used as our control for presence of young children in the family. Values for this variable range between 1 indicating the presence of a child less than two years, and 9 indicating the presence of no children under the age of eighteen.
iii These control variables are of no theoretical or policy interest in the present discussion. Nonetheless, controls are used here to remove doubt about independence of asset effects.
Variables of Theoretical and Policy Interest
The Duncan and Hill, 1975, p.74) . In our analysis, unlike the original risk avoidance index, the index for prudence does not incorporate the adequacy of savings as one of the proxy measures. In other words, measure of prudence is the same as the risk avoidance index minus the reserve funds measure. We undertook this alteration in the risk avoidance index to avoid confounding variables, because one of our asset variables is the savings reserve index.
Efficacy is the efficacy-planning index developed by PSID staff from responses to specific questions about feelings, expectations, and confidence about the future. vii The index reflects a respondent's satisfaction with self and confidence about the future (Survey Research Center, 1972a) . Horizons is the horizon proxies index, which includes responses to questions about obtaining a new job, having more children, and having specific educational goals for one's children. viii Horizons is an index of the specificity of a respondent's plans concerning labor market participation and family (Ehrlich, 1975) . Horizons index indicates whether individuals have explicit plans to move to obtain a new job; explicit plans to have more children; and specific educational goals for ones children. Connectedness is an index of connectedness to sources of information and help. The index assesses whether a respondent is in contact with relatives and neighbors or is active in certain organizations. ix Both the horizon proxies index and the connectedness index have been termed "advantageous behaviors" in prior research (Duncan and Hill, 1975) . Effort is the real earning acts index, which is composed of behaviors that result in non-money income or investment in human capital (Survey Research Center 1972a, p. 364); this has been termed a "coping behavior" by Duncan and Hill (1975) . x In the current analysis, we do not employ a distinction between advantageous behaviors and coping behaviors (for a discussion of the content and construction of indexes used in this analysis, see Survey Research
Center 1972a, pp. 363-72; 1972b, pp. 787-92) .
Together, the five attitude and behavior variables are the closest approximations that PSID data provide to the hypothesized asset effects suggested by Sherraden (1990 Sherraden ( , 1991 .
Overall, these variables represent desirable personal and social attributes consistent with the aims of social policy. Horizons, connectedness, and effort are particularly relevant to the content of the current welfare reform debate. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analysis. 
Results
The overall fit of the baseline structural equation model was adequate. The model has a Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) of .96; Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index of (AGFI) of .81;
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of .94 and a Relative Fit Index (RFI) of .74. While GFI indicates a very good fit, the chi-square measure of fit indicated a less than adequate fit (χ2=1115.40, df=48, p= .0). Discrepancy among measures of fit can be easily explained. It is known that some measures of model fit --chi-square measure of fit is foremost among them --are prone to sample size effects. As sample size becomes large so does the chi-square statistic, leading one to falsely reject a model even if the model has an adequate fit (Yadama and Pandey, in press). Because our analysis is based on a large sample size (N=2871), it is reasonable to expect large chi-square values and therefore we relied on other measures of fit that are not as affected by sample size.
Our results indicate that several of the errors in equations (ζs) predicting the dependent variables are correlated. Errors in equations predicting income and house value were allowed to correlate and so were errors in equations predicting savings and horizons. The final model, with the loss of only two degrees of freedom, is a markedly improved model with excellent indicators of fit.
The fit of our model improved upon freeing these error terms (χ2 = 383.22, df = 46, p =.0; GFI = .99; AGFI = .93; CFI = .98; RFI = .91). The root mean square residual for the final model is low (RMR = .021), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is .051 (P-Value for test of close fit = .40), both measures indicating a good overall fit. Table 2 reports results of our analysis testing for the effect of income and assets on attitudes and behaviors and vice versa. Effects of each asset variable on the five attitude and behavior measures are assessed only after controlling for age, race, gender, education, age of youngest child, and the effect of the time one score of a given dependent variable. Coefficients for control variables are not reported here because they are not of analytical interest (however, readers may be interested to know that effects of assets actually increase in the presence of control variables, while effects of income diminish). As stated above, income is included in the analysis as an alternative explanation for attitudes and behaviors.
In this analysis we find a number of significant but modest effects (Table 2) 
Alternative Explanations
As alternative explanations, we turn first to the possibility that it is income rather than assets that affects attitudes and behaviors. Looking at standardized path coefficients (Table 2) , two out of five effects of income on attitudes and behaviors are significant and positive, as follows: prudence (b = .05, p ≤ .05), and horizons (b = .05, p ≤ .05). Efficacy, connectedness, and effort are not significantly related to income. While there are some income effects, as anticipated, it is noteworthy that the income effects are overall not as prominent and strong as the savings effects (Table 2) .
We turn next to the possibility that attitudes and behaviors cause assets rather than vice versa. We have estimated the effects of attitudes and behaviors on savings, house value and income (Table 2 ). Four out of ten effects relating to assets are significant: prudence has a significant positive effect on house value b = .05, p ≤ .01) but not on savings; efficacy has a significant positive effect on savings (b = .05, p ≤=.01); connectedness has a significant positive effect on savings (b = .04, p ≤ .01); effort has a significant effect on house value (b = .03, p ≤ .05). One relationship is significant in the opposite direction: effort has a significant negative effect on savings (b = -.06, p ≤ .01). Overall, the effects of attitudes and behaviors on assets are in the predicted pattern, but quite modest.
Discussion and Conclusion
While this test of asset effects is far from perfect, it does have two highly desirable features: (1) it is longitudinal and (2) it simultaneously considers two alternative explanations.
All of this occurs in a single statistical test. In this regard, the design of the analysis is as concise and elegant as we could hope. Seldom in social science research do we have an opportunity for a simultaneous test of key competing theories. We are very fortunate indeed that a data set existed which made the test possible.
Results support some of the hypothesized effects. One of the asset variables --savings --has significant effects in the predicted direction on three of the attitude and behavioral variables.
House value has a significant positive effect on prudence. Also, we can say that the savings and house value effects on attitudes and behaviors occur above and beyond the effects of income. In addition, we can offer a cautious statement of causality. Because of the construction of the statistical tests across longitudinal data, we can say that savings at one point in time affects attitudes and behaviors at a second point in time. We can also draw a similar conclusion for the effect of house value on prudence.
In this study, savings stands out as being particularly important in possibly influencing attitudes and behaviors. These effects are consistent with Sherraden's broadly stated propositions in that assets (1) have a positive effect on expectations and confidence about the future, (2) influence people to make specific plans with regard to work and family, (3) induce more prudent and protective personal behaviors, and (4) lead to more social connectedness with relatives, neighbors, and organizations. Clearly, much more work remains to be done in theoretically specifying and confirming these asset effects, but overall results suggest that the thinking is "on the right track."
One of the dependent variables, effort, is unrelated to assets. The general proposition is that when people have assets, they put in more effort in maintaining those and other assets.
Although home-ownership and other literature largely supports this view, the current study does not. As an alternative proposition, perhaps when people have assets they tend to purchase services (home repair, car repair) and do not try as hard for human capital improvements (training for a new job, going back to school). This question is certainly fundamental to any consideration of asset-based social policy, and more studies are needed.
Looking at the first alternative explanation, the effects of income on attitudes and behaviors are not as strong as the effects of savings. This finding should give us considerable pause. Social policy in Western welfare states is dominated by the provision of income, either as "social insurance" or means-tested transfer. If savings provide equal or stronger effects on attitudes or behaviors --and at the same time, economic development of households--then perhaps more social policy should promote asset accumulation in this form.
In a test of the second alternative explanation --that attitudes and behaviors cause assets --we find that attitudes and behaviors do have some significant effects on asset accumulation.
Thus, without overstating the strength of the findings, it appears that "it works both ways" in the sense that assets lead to more positive attitudes and behaviors, and the same attitudes and behaviors lead to more assets. This is perhaps an empirical glimpse of a "virtuous circle" in household development--assets lead to more positive attitudes and behaviors, which in turn lead to more assets, and so on.
Turning to research issues, these results, while not overwhelming, suggest that assets deserve as much attention as income in studies that relate economic status with psychological and social variables. Moreover, the traditional emphasis on studying economic status as an outcome of attitudes and behaviors should be expanded to include the reverse proposition: in this case, that assets positively affect certain attitudes and behaviors.
Considering the restricted five year time period used in this analysis, it is also possible that the observed effects could be different --either larger or disappear altogether --over a longer time period. Ideally, future longitudinal tests would incorporate a longer time frame (although absence of attitudinal and behavioral measures in the PSID since 1972 is a problem in this regard). Future studies should also include more robust measures of attitudes and behaviors. It would also be helpful if future research examined these questions through a variety of methods.
Regarding asset-based policy demonstrations, at this writing the State of Iowa has passed legislation for an IDA demonstration over five years. Several small IDA projects are underway at local agencies around the country. Evaluation designs for most IDA experiments are to include social and psychological effects. President Clinton's proposal for an IDA demonstration also would require testing social and psychological effects. Given the results of this study, we conclude that the policy demonstrations are warranted.
Notes
i A related proposal in public policy is the idea of capital accounts, primarily for youth, which have been suggested by Tobin (1970 ), Haveman (1988 ), and Sawhill (1989 . These proposals are for a single lump-sum distribution late in adolescence, which might be thought of as a multi-purpose voucher for health, welfare, and education choices. However, the intention of these proposals is to provide a fund for welfare consumption choices. Effects of asset holding, other than for consumption choices, have not been discussed by these authors.
ii More reliable data on assets were gathered in 1984; however, since PSID data on attitudes and behaviors precedes the more reliable data on assets, it is not possible to examine the effect of assets on attitudes and behaviors after 1972. income from those who have savings greater than two months' income. While asset-based policy demonstrations do not limit themselves to encouraging savings of only two months' income, we are limited by the available data on savings included in the PSID. v A note regarding two attitude and behavioral indexes that are available in the PSID but not employed in this analysis: An aspiration-ambition index is not used because it has resulted in counter intuitive effects in the past and the measure may be flawed. Duncan and Hill (1975, p.64) find a negative effect of income on the aspiration-ambition index, which they suggest obtains from certain components of the index, such as planning for or doing something about a better job, which are components generally associated with unsatisfactory income. An economizing behavior index is not used because we can find no proposition in the literature that suggests a relationship between asset holding and economizing behavior (indeed, we might anticipate the opposite). Duncan and Hill (1975) Duncan and Hill (1975, p.74) .
vii Efficacy (efficacy-planning index of PSID) is computed using five questions measuring a personal sense of effectiveness in carrying out plans and also a general future orientation of the respondent. Respondents were asked whether they thought life would work out; if they generally get to carry out the plans they envisioned; if they were future oriented or lived from day to day.
In our path analysis we used the efficacy-planning index for 1968 (V419) and 1972 (V2939) to assess the effect of assets while controlling for time one effects. For greater detail on the questions and the variables see Survey Research Center (1972a, p.367) and Duncan and Hill (1975, pp.83-89) .
viii Horizons (horizons proxies index of PSID) is computed using responses to questions about explicit plans to move to obtain a new job, explicit plans to have more children, specific educational goals for one's children. All asset effects on the horizons index are examined after controlling for the effects of prior Horizons. Horizons index for 1968 is V391 and for 1972 it is 18 V2946. For greater detail see Survey Research Center (1972a, p.364) and Ehrlich (1975, pp.189-207) for prior application of the Horizons index.
ix Connectedness (the connectedness index of PSID) determines the extent to which a head of household is in touch with sources of information and help. "Contact with relatives and neighbors belonging to organizations, and use of the media are hypothesized to enhance opportunities for information and its potential use" (Survey Research Center, 1972a, p.363 ).
This index is computed using nine specific variables that assess attendance at organizations; use of the media; acquaintance with neighbors and relatives; and participation in any labor union (Survey Research Center, 1972a, p.363; Duncan and Hill, 1975, p.113) . The connectedness index is represented by variables V393 (1968) and V2947 (1972).
x Effort (real earnings acts index of PSID) indicates behaviors which result in nonmoney income or investment in human capital. The index is constructed from responses to questions on the extent of home repair, car repair, home gardening and other productive money saving or human capital accumulation activities undertaken in one's spare time. The index is calculated from responses to four specific questions (see Duncan and Hill, 1975, pp.94-96) . The effort index is represented by variables V395 (1968) and V2943 (1972) .
